ABSTRACT
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Manski (1993) showed that in a linear-in-expectations model with social interactions, endogenous and exogenous peer effects cannot be identified separately. To overcome this negative result, empirical studies usually rely on instrumental strategies, which impose strong exogeneity conditions. In the context of pupils achievement for instance 1 , Hoxby (2000) and Ammermueller and Pischke (2006) suppose that variations in time or between classrooms within the same school are random. Moreover, estimation is based upon reduced forms, so that the structural parameters cannot be recovered. In other terms, one cannot distinguish between exogenous and endogenous peer effects. However, Lee (2006) has recently proposed a modified version of the social interaction model, which corresponds to a linear-in-means model, and which is shown to be identifiable without any of the previous restrictive assumptions, thanks to the group size variation.
Whereas Lee (2006) is mainly concerned with the estimation of the linear-in-means model, we focus on its identification. More precisely, the aim of our paper is threefold. Firstly, we clarify the identification result proposed by Lee (2006) for the linear-in means model. We show that the crucial assumptions here are 1) the knowledge of the group sizes, and 2) the fact that group sizes take at least three different values. On the other hand, and contrary to usual identification strategies based on reduced forms and exclusion restrictions, one does not need to observe all members of the group. This contrasts with the method based on the reduced form, where measurement errors arise as soon as some members of the groups are missing in the data (see Graham and Hahn, 2005) . Moreover, neither parametric assumption nor homoskedasticity restriction (as assumption 1 in Lee's paper, 2006 ) is needed in general.
Yet, we show that, in some special cases, the homoskedasticity assumption is required for recovering the structural parameters.
Secondly, we extend the analysis beyond the linear-in-means model. One important limitation of this model is the fact that the mean outcome does not depend on the allocation of individuals across groups. We consider a model with asymmetric responses to peers, and show that almost all parameters can then be identified. However, some parameters are identified only when the whole group is observed. We also consider the case of binary outcomes. Iden-tification of discrete models with social interactions has already been studied by, e.g., Durlauf (2001, 2004) . Our model is slightly different, though, as we assume that social interactions may affect individuals through peers' latent variables rather than through their observable outcomes. This is convenient when only binary outcomes are observable, because of data limitation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such a model is studied in the literature. The attractive feature of our result is that it does not rely on any functional assumption concerning the errors. Yet, due to data limitation, homoskedasticity is needed to recover endogenous peer effects.
Thirdly, we discuss the theoretical background of the linear-in-means model. We show that, in the framework of a noncooperative game between members of the group, the Nash equilibrium satisfies Lee's model (2006) , Manski's model (1993) or an intermediate version of these two models, depending on the amount of common knowledge of the players. Lee's model (2006) arises when their information is rich whereas Manski's model emerges when players have little information on their peers. This, along with the slow rate of convergence obtained by Lee (2006) when groups are large, shows that our model should rather be used when groups are small. Lastly, we also show that our model can be viewed as the stationary equilibrium of a dynamic model. Interestingly, one of the identifying assumption arises as a stability condition of this model. The paper is organized as follows. The first section goes back on the identification of the linear-in-means model. Section two considers an extension to the case of asymmetric responses to peers. Section three is devoted to the discrete case. The fourth section discusses the theoretical foundations of the linear-in-means model. Section five concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix.
The linear-in-means model
Suppose that we observe R non-overlapping groups (r = 1, ..., R). Group r has size m r . The outcome variable y ri for individual i in group r is assumed to be a linear function of her own observable covariates, denoted x ri , but also of the outcome variables and observable covariates of her peers, and of a group-specific (fixed) effect, according to the linear-in-means model of Lee (2006) : 2
Following the terminology introduced by Manski (1993) , the second term in the right hand side corresponds to the endogenous peer effect, the third refers to the exogenous peer effects and α r is a contextual (group-specific) effect. This model essentially departs from the one considered by Manski (1993) or by Graham and Hahn (2005) by replacing, on the right-hand side, the expectations relative to the whole group by the means of outcomes and covariates in the group of peers. 3 As shown by Lee (2006) , this small difference allows to obtain identification of the structural parameters, as soon as there is sufficient group variation.
In this section, we clarify and extend some results obtained by Lee (2006) . We restrict our analysis to the case where m r does not depend on the size of the sample. 4 We believe that, in practice, such an assumption is virtually always satisfied. For instance, there is no reason why the mean classroom size should depend on the size of the sample. Moreover, this restriction enables us to clarify the identification results by showing what comes from the usual exogeneity condition (see assumption A5 below) and when homoscedasticity is necessary (see theorem 2 below). On the other hand, we do not impose that all members of the groups are observed; we denote n r the number of sampled individuals in group r.
As emphasized by Lee (2006) , identification is achieved by the within-group equation, that is (see equation (2.5) of Lee, 2006 )
where Y r (respectively, X r and ε r ) is the vector of outcomes (respectively, of observed covariates and unobserved residuals) for individuals sampled in group r, and W nr denotes the within-group matrix of size n r .To recover the structural parameters, we use the variation in A1. For all r = 1, ..., R, ( Y r , X r , m r , n r ) are i.i.d.
A2
. sup(Supp(n 1 )) ≥ 2 (where Supp(n 1 ) = {k ∈ N, Pr(n 1 = k) > 0}).
A3. m 1 , ..., m r are known and card(Supp(m 1 )) ≥ 3 (where for all
Assumption A2 simply states that the within-group approach is possible. Assumption A3 is crucial; it imposes that group sizes are known and that these sizes vary sufficiently in the sample. Assumption A1, A4 and A5 are standard in linear panel data models, except that conditional expectations depend here both on the number of observed individuals in each group and on the group size. Conditioning by n 1 does not cause any trouble if, for instance, the observed individuals are drawn at random from the group. Finally, assumption A6, which is very similar to assumption 4 introduced by Lee (2006) , ensures that β(m) exists for all m ∈ Supp(m 1 ). 5 As we will see in section 5, this assumption arises as the stability condition of a dynamic model. This theorem states that all parameters are generally identified provided that there is sufficient variation in the group sizes, (m r ) r . As a notable exception, identification is lost in the absence of endogenous and exogenous peer effects (since then β 20 = −λ 0 β 10 = 0). One can always rationalize such a model with any λ 0 = 0 and β 20 = −λ 0 β 10 . Below, we provide a method which yields identification in this case, but it relies on a stronger assumption of homoskedasticity. In any case, one can check whether identification is lost or not, since this amounts to test whether β(.), which is always identified, is constant.
Contrary to the reduced form approach, we do not need to know the means (x r ) 1≤r≤R on the whole groups to identify the parameters. Thus the problem of measurement error of x r , which appears when some individuals in the group are unobserved, does not arise in our framework. Here the crucial assumption is the knowledge of the group size. If it is unknown but can be estimated, the measurement error problem comes back in a nonlinear way. The issue of identification in this case is left for future research. 6
Another identifying assumption is the additive nature of the group size effect. Indeed, m r may be correlated with α r in a general way, but we cannot add interaction terms m r × x ri to the list of regressors, since then assumption A5 would fail. Moreover, β 10 , β 20 and λ 0 are assumed to be independent of the group size. An informal test of this assumption would be to estimate (β 10 , β 20 , λ 0 ) on strata made of groups with at least three different sizes, and to compare the estimates obtained from different strata.
If β 20 = −λ 0 β 10 , then λ 0 and β 20 cannot be identified. However they can be recovered by studying variance variation under an homoskedasticity condition (assumption A7 below).
More precisely, the conditional variance of the residuals should not depend on the group size.
This hypothesis is quite weak since it does not restrict the relationship between the residuals ε ri and the covariates x ri . Moreover, under A7, one needs less variation on the group sizes than previously and we can replace assumption A3 by A3'. A7. Var ( ε 1 | n 1 , m 1 ) = σ 2 I n 1 where I n 1 is the identity matrix of size n 1 .
Theorem 2. Under assumptions A1-A2, A3' and A4-A7, (β 10 , λ 0 , β 20 ) are identified.
The idea of using second order moments has already been used by Graham (2005) to identify peer effects. On the contrary to us, however, he can only estimate the posterior distribution of λ 0 in a Bayesian framework.
Asymmetric responses to peers' outcomes
One major limitation of the basic linear-in-means model is its functional form. In particular, the fact that everybody reacts similarly to peers is often considered implausible. 7 Moreover, this restriction implies that the composition of groups does not affect the mean outcome.
Hence, if this outcome corresponds to the individual utility, rearranging groups is useless in terms of public policy under a utilitarian social welfare. 8 For instance, losses due to the reallocation of students in classrooms should perfectly compensate for the gains of these reallocation. Thus, the model implies that the much debated issue of tracking versus mixing in classrooms is irrelevant in terms of efficiency.
To allow for asymmetric reactions to endogenous effects, one could consider, as Cooley (2006), a general nonlinear model. However, the identification of her model relies on the existence of a valid instrument. Instead, we propose a simple extension to the basic model (1) that does not require any exclusion restriction, because our identification strategy still works out in this framework. More precisely, we suppose that
where t ri denotes an observable characteristic of individual i. For the sake of simplicity, we consider that t ri is binary (and may take value 0 or 1). 9 The assumption that β 10 does not depend on t ri can be relaxed without loss of generality by including in x ri some interaction terms between t ri and the other covariates. On the other hand, an exclusion restriction is needed for identification, and we assume that x ri is not reduced to t ri . Let us denote x −t ri the components of x ri different from t ri .
Though simple, this model enables us to overcome the aforementioned drawback. Indeed, some tedious algebra gives:
where, for k ∈ {0, 1}, x r (k) denotes the mean among individuals i of group r for whom Let β t 10 (respectively, β t 20 (t)) denote the component of the parameter vector β 10 (respectively, β 20 (t)) which corresponds to covariate t. For instance, if t denotes the ethnic group of a pupil in a classroom (with, e.g., t = 0 for a white pupil and t = 1 for a black pupil), β t 10 denotes the impact of being black on, e.g., achievement, and β t 20 (0) denotes the effect of the proportion of blacks in the group on the achievement of a white pupil. β −t 10 and β −t 20 (t) correspond to the other components of parameter vectors β 10 and β 20 (t). The following additional assumptions are required for identification of these parameters:
Assumption A2' states that there are some subgroups in which at least two individuals are observed, so that we can use the within equation on subgroups with a positive probability.
Assumption A5' supposes that variables are linearly independent within subgroups, almost surely. Assumption A8 is made for convenience. If it does not hold, one can still obtain partial identification results, as in theorem 1. Assumption A9 is restrictive, since it supposes in practice that all individuals belonging to a group are observed. However, it is not required to identify parameters β −t 10 , λ 0 (k) and β −t 20 (k), k ∈ {0, 1}.
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Theorem 3. Under assumptions A1, A2', A3, A4, A5', A6 and A8, β −t −t 20 (k) (k ∈ {0, 1}) are identified. Moreover, if assumption A9 holds, β t 10 and β t 20 (k) (k ∈ {0, 1}) can also be recovered.
The discrete case
In this section, we investigate whether the parameters are still identified when one cannot observe directly the outcome variable but only a rough (binary) measure of it. In other terms, we observe y ri = 1{y * ri ≥ 0}, where y * ri satisfies equation (1). For instance, to study pupil achievement, only grade retention rather than test scores may be available. Similarly, in violence studies, only criminal (that is, sufficiently violent) acts can be observed by the econometrician. Note that these models remain essentially linear because the underlying model is linear. One could also study the case where y * ri depends on y rj rather than y * rj . Such models, which have been studied by Durlauf (2001, 2004) , Bayer and Timmins (2002) , Tamer (2003) and Krauth (2006) , are more complex because in general multiple equilibria arise.
When the outcome is a binary variable, the reduced-form equation (3) is useless for identification because W nr Y * r (where Y * r is the vector of latent outcomes for observed individuals of r) has no observational counterpart. Instead, we rely on equation (4) below. The result is obtained under A6', which is slightly stronger than assumption A6. Note that A6' holds under the stability condition of the dynamic model that will be proposed in section 5 (see proposition 1 below).
A6': λ 0 > 1 − min (Supp(m 1 )) and λ 0 = 1. Lemma 1. Suppose that y ri = 1{y * ri ≥ 0} with y * ri satisfying equation (1), and that assumption A6' holds. Then the model is observationally equivalent to
The term in brackets corresponds to a group-specific effect. Thus we are led back to a binary model for panel data. Identification of such a model has been considered, among others, by Manski (1987) , and our analysis relies on his paper. 
A11. Let z = x 2 − x 1 . 10 The support of F z is not contained in any proper linear subspace of
A12. There exists k 0 such that z k 0 has everywhere a positive Lebesgue density conditional on
Without loss of generality we set k 0 = 1.
The first part of assumption A10 holds for instance if (ε i ) i=1,...,m is conditionally independent of (x i ) i=1,...,m given m and α, and if (ε i ) i=1,...,m are exchangeable conditionally on m, α.
Hence, it is satisfied if the (ε i ) i=1,...,m are i.i.d. and independent of (x 1 , ..., x m , m, α). The second part of assumption A10 is a technical condition, which is identical to the second part of assumption 1 set forth by Manski (1987) . Assumption A11 ensures that z varies enough within a group. As usually in binary models, one parameter must be normalized and this is the purpose of A12. However, a small difficulty arises here, because the reduced form does not allow us to recover the sign of the structural parameters. A sufficient condition is to fix one parameter (and not only its absolute value): thus we set β 1 10 = 1. 11
Theorem 4. Suppose that assumptions A1-A3, A6' and A10-A12 hold. Then β 10 is identified. (4)). Heuristically, without any hypothesis imposed on these terms, any λ 0 can be rationalized by changing accordingly α and the (ε i ) 1≤i≤m .
Thus, stronger assumptions are needed for identifying λ 0 . One possibility is to observe x and to restrict the dependence between the residuals and the covariates. A9'. x is observed.
A15. Given (x, m), the support of x 1 (β 10 −
As mentioned above, assumption A9' is a restrictive condition as it imposes either to observe all individuals in the group or to consider only the covariates for which the means are known.
Assumption A13 is in the same spirit than assumption A10. It restricts the dependence between α and the covariates to a dependence on the mean. Assumption A14 is the assumption of homoskedasticity in m; it is very similar to assumption A7. The difference between both assumptions stems from the identifying equation we use in both cases. In the discrete model, α remains in expression (4) and thus its variance must be modeled as well as its covariance with the (ε i ) 1≤i≤m . 12 Lastly, assumption A15 is a condition of large support. It especially implies that m ≥ 3. Otherwise, indeed, the two variables belong to a line in R 2 .
Theorem 5. Under assumptions A1-A3, A6', A9', and A10-A15 and if β 20 = β 1 20 β 10 , λ 0 is also identified.
Theoretical background
Model (1) is very close to the one considered by Manski (1993) or by Graham and Hahn (2005) .
Yet conclusions much differ since the basic linear-in-means model is generically identified without any exclusion restriction. Thus, one should set forth the reasons to choose this model rather than the linear-in-expectations model. An argument borrowed from game theory shows that this choice is in fact better justified for small groups. Indeed, we show below that identification depends on the information set of players. Equation (1) arises when players are fully informed, whereas Manski's model corresponds to an imperfect information situation.
We also consider an intermediate situation where homoscedasticity is lost, and thus theorem 2 cannot be applied.
Suppose that the utility of player i has the following form:
where we suppose here that the individual specific terms (ε ri ) i are mutually independent and independent of (x ri , α r , m r ). In this game, the marginal returns of individual i depend on her peers' outcomes. This captures the fact that people are influenced by their peers' behavior.
If λ 0 > 0, player i tries to conform to other members of her group, whereas she tries to stand out from them when λ 0 < 0. This model is close to the one developed by Cooley (2006) for examining pupil achievement in the classroom.
Assuming that α r and the (x ri , ε ri ) 1≤i≤mr are observed by all players in group r, the Nash equilibrium of the game (e * r1 , ..., e * rmr ) satisfies equation (1). Thus, using theorems 1 and 2, all parameters are identified provided that there is sufficient variation in group sizes. 13 Now suppose that the (ε rj ) j =i are unobserved by player i. This situation is realistic in moderately large groups where each player observes the characteristic x rj of j but not her 13 This conclusion still holds if we do not observe the optimal effort e * ri but instead the corresponding outcome yri = e * ri +ηri, where ηri is an unanticipated shock, independent of other variables. A quick examination reveals that in the within-group equation (3), shocks are not homoskedastic anymore, but the proof of theorem 2 can be adapted provided that at least three different group sizes are available.
idiosyncratic shock. Then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium satisfies: 14
Taking the conditional expectation leads to, for i = k,
because, by independence of the
. Hence, taking the expectation of (5) and comparing with (6) leads to E(e * ri | ε rk ) = E(e * ri ) for all i = k. Replacing E(e * rj | ε ri ) by E(e * rj ) in (5), we get e * ri = E(e * ri ) + ε ri . Finally, substituting e * rj − ε * rj to E(e * rj ) in (5), we obtain: mr−1 . This equation is very similar to (1) and the parameters can be identified using the exogeneity of covariates. However, the errors become heteroskedastic. More precisely, the variance of residuals in the within-group equation (2) is no more dependent on m r , so that λ 0 cannot be recovered by using this device, as in theorem 2. Identification of β 20 and λ 0 is lost when β 20 = −λ 0 β 10 .
Lastly, let us suppose that the (x rj ) j =i are also unobserved by i but that α r is still observed.
If groups are large, player i may not know j and thus does not observe neither ε rj nor x rj .
On the other hand, she may know the general features of the group, represented by α r and E(x r1 | α r ). Then, proceeding as previously, we can easily show that
Thus we are led back to Manski's model (1993) , which is not identifiable.
14 All expectations are in fact taken conditionally on (xri) 1≤i≤mr and αr. We omit them for the sake of simplicity.
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Another structural interpretation of the model is to consider equation (1) as the stationary state of a dynamic model with interactions. Let y t ri denote the outcome of individual i in group r at date t, and suppose that the variation in this outcome at date t is generated by the following first-order differential equation:
In other terms, the variation in the i-th individual's outcome at date t depends on her current outcome and on her time-constant observable covariates, but also on the mean of her peers' outcomes at date t and on the mean of their time-constant observable covariates. In the example of a classroom, λ 0 > 0 implies that a pupil will get better test scores when the mean score of her classmates is higher.
Proposition 1. Equation (7) admits a stable solution for all r = 1...R if and only if
Provided that µ = −1, this solution is given by equation (1).
Setting µ = −1 is natural in view of identification. Indeed, in the steady state, dy t ri dt = 0 so that equation (7) can be normalized without loss of generality. Proposition 1 states that if the dynamic model is true, then λ 0 lies in a known interval. Interestingly, this restriction (λ 0 > 1 − min r (m r )) is used both in Lee's paper (assumption 3) and in ours (assumption A6 and A6') to identify the model.
Conclusion
This paper considers identification of linear social interaction models using group size variation.
Provided that the size of the group is known and varies sufficiently, endogenous and exogenous effects can be identified without any exclusion restriction. Moreover, the method does not require to observe all members of the group. The result is extended to asymmetric models and binary outcomes. We also show that, from a game theoretic point of view, our analysis is more relevant for small groups such as classrooms. When groups are large, Manski's model (1993) should be more appropriate in terms of players' information. The result is also in line with the weak identification result of Lee (2006) in the case of large groups.
Our paper has two main limitations. First, the size of the group is assumed to be known. However, as emphasized by Manski (2000) , it is often difficult to define groups on an a priori background. This criticism is common to all models of social interactions, but may be especially problematic here. Indeed, ignoring the boundaries of the group leads (among other difficulties) to measurement errors on the group size, which could prevent identification. Second, we do not consider a fully nonparametric regression. The issue of whether group size variation has an identifying power in this general case remains to be settled. This amounts to show that the system
has a unique solution. Using the matrix form, we can rewrite the system as Aζ 0 = B where 
Hence,
, which is in contradiction with the fact that β(.) is a one-to-one mapping. Thus det(A) = 0 and ζ 0 is identified.
Theorem 2
It is clear that 
Theorem 3
Let i 1 and i 2 be two individuals in group r such as t ri 1 = t ri 2 = k. Then
.
Thus, by application of Theorem 1 on both subgroups, β Let y ri denote the left hand side of this equation; it is identified thanks to the previous result and to assumption A9. Taking i 1 and i 3 such as t ri 1 = 1, t ri 3 = 0, we get
This regression (over groups of the same size but with different t r ) enables us to recover the constant (m r − 1)β t 10 − β t 20 (1) and β t 20 (1) − β t 20 (0). Then making m r vary allows us to identify β t 10 and β t 20 (1), and thus β t 20 (0).
Lemma 1
Applying the between-group operator to (1) gives However, λ 0 cannot be identified. Indeed, let λ 0 = λ 0 and define
. Then (λ 0 , α , ε 1 , ..., ε m ) are observationally equivalent to the initial model. Indeed, we can check that they lead to (4) as well. Moreover, conditioning on (m, x 1 , ..., x m , α ) is equivalent to conditioning on (m, x 1 , ..., x m , α), and conditional exchangeability of (ε 1 , ..., ε m ) implies conditional exchangeability of the (ε 1 , ..., ε m ). Furthermore, This is a regression of the (known) left term on (m 2 , m, 1). Because m takes at least three values, the coefficients (a, b, c) of this regression can be recovered. 15 We will show that the knowledge of these coefficients implies that θ 0 is identified. The conclusion will follow because θ 0 is one-to-one with λ 0 . 
This system admits at most two solutions in (ρ, φ). Suppose that there are two different solutions, and let (ρ 1 , φ 1 ) denote the second one. Then we can write the polynomial of the first equation as a product in which one factor is the polynomial of the second equation.
Hence, there exists x such as, for all φ ∈ R, φ 3 + c /2φ 2 − a /2 = (φ 2 + 2c /3φ 2 + b /3)(φ + x).
Hence c 2 = 3b . Replacing b and c by their expression gives 3(−2φρ + φ 2 ) = (ρ − 2φ) 2 , which must hold for (ρ 0 , φ 0 ) and (ρ 1 , φ 1 ). But this statement is equivalent to φ + ρ = 0.
Replacing ρ by −φ in c gives φ 0 = φ 1 = −c /3 and thus also ρ 0 = ρ 1 . This contradicts (ρ 0 , φ 0 ) = (ρ 1 , φ 1 ). Thus φ 0 is identified by 8 and the conclusion follows.
15 These coefficients depend on x but for the sake of simplicity, we let this dependency implicit from now on.
